Training in the UK and public policy from Carr to Leitch: 
the potential application of the governance perspective 
to a troubled arena

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Abstract

UK public policy on skills training has been subject to various government interventions since the late 1950s, at seemingly regular intervals, with limited success. This paper argues that this area may be usefully examined through a *governance* approach. Emphasising the processual nature of governing, which involves many more actors than just the government, the governance approach provides a perspective on troubling areas such as skills training. The case of the period in which most ITBs were abolished is examined from such a perspective. The paper concludes that this demonstrates the utility of the approach which may usefully now be deployed to consider the current situation.

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Introduction

UK public policy on skills training and development, or ‘workforce development’ to use the term adopted by the Performance and Innovation Unit (2001), has been subject to various interventions by governments since the late 1950s, at seemingly regular intervals. From Carr (Ministry of Labour and National Service, 1958) to Leitch (2006), a similar tale is told, largely emphasising the need for the UK to have a more highly trained workforce to be able to compete within the global economy, and drawing attention to the UK’s relative low levels of skills compared with other competitor nations. Various explanations are put forward for the problems, and remedies presented. With the notable exception of the era of the industrial training boards, the use of regulatory powers for enforcement of employer investment has been eschewed in favour of exhortation and financial inducements, delivered through a changing set of institutions and agencies, and modifications to qualifications espousedly to make these ‘more relevant’ to the workplace. The latest intervention, the Leitch Review (Leitch, 2006) strongly suggests that previous interventions have not succeeded. However, the reasons for their lack of success remains unexplained; without an adequate explanation, the likelihood of the success of the Leitch proposals must remain questionable. In particular, the assumption that, this time, the proposed arrangements will be successful, and that employers and others will play the part allocated to them, seems a matter of hope over experience.
The general conclusion to all reviews can be summed up as “something should be done”. This implies, of course, that something can be done. The major reviews have been instigated by government, mainly Conservative until the latest review set up by the Treasury under a Labour Government. The main warrant given for government involvement is that of the importance of skills for the national economy. As Leitch puts it

“In the 21st Century, our natural resource is our people – and their potential is both untapped and vast. Skills will unlock that potential. The prize for our country will be enormous – higher productivity, the creation of wealth and social justice.”
(Leitch, 2006, p. 1)

The involvement of the government in initiating and sponsoring reviews, and the interventions made by government, indicate an assumption that this was matter amenable to policy analysis and policy prescription. In other words, this paper argues, the matter is one of governance.

The paper will provide a brief introduction to the way in which the term ‘governance’ is currently being used in the conceptualisation, theorisation and investigation of social, economic and political affairs. It will then briefly consider the history of public policy on skills training and development in the UK over the past five decades, from Carr (Ministry of Labour and National Service, 1958) to Leitch (2006), and particularly how this has been presented. A particular point in that policy history, the decision taken in 1981 to abolish most of the industrial training boards (ITBs) and the aftermath of that decision, will then be taken into more detailed re-consideration, broadly adopting a governance approach. The paper will argue that the utility of the governance approach to that period indicates its utility for application to the current review by (Leitch, 2006).
A ‘Governance approach’

The term ‘governance’ has been increasingly deployed in recent public policy theorising and research (see, eg, Kooiman, 1993; Rhodes, 1996; Pierre and Peters, 2000; Pierre, 2000; Richards and Smith, 2002; Kooiman, 2003). Although used in a variety of ways, with different meanings, Pierre and Peters (2000) attribute the popularity of ‘governance’, in contrast the narrower term ‘government’, to its capacity “to cover the whole range of institutions and relationships involved in the process of governing” (p. 1; emphasis added). The term has arisen within new thinking about the nature of the state, its relationship to the economy and civil society more generally, and the capacities and limitations of governments to direct and control activities with the economy and society. Governing is thus seen to be not restricted to the actions and activities of government, but as the “more of less continuous process of interactions between social actors, groups and forces and public or semi public organizations, institutions or authorities” (Kooiman, 1993, p. 3). The etymology of the word ‘government’ from the Latin for ‘steering’ is used to emphasise the limitations of governments to direct and control the economic and social affairs under conditions of complexity and uncertainty, whilst indicating that governments do have a role to play.

“The governance concept points to the creation of a structure or an order which cannot be externally imposed but is the result of the interaction of a multiplicity of governing and each other influencing actors.” (Kooiman and van Vliet, 1993, 64)

As Stoker (Stoker, 1998) puts it, governance is “ultimately concerned with creating the conditions for orderly rule and collective action”, focussing on “governing
mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of
government” (p. 17).

Such a use of the term ‘governance’ is clearly different from that adopted in the
literature on corporate governance, particularly where the latter mainly focuses upon
composition of boards of directors, and the roles and responsibilities of directors.
Kooiman (Kooiman, 2003) uses the term ‘socio-political governance’ to indicate the
focus on the broad issues concerning how social and economic order comes about. It
is in that sense that the term ‘governance’ is used here. This paper argues that the
issues arising in public policy on skills training, workforce development may be
usefully viewed in terms of an approach based on this concept of governance.

The governance approach, or perspective, has been the basis for considerable
theorising and research over the past two decades, within policy studies. There is not
one single governance theory, but rather a number of different modes of developing
theoretical models and undertaking empirical investigation. There are a number of key
themes, however, relating to the intentional adoption of the notion of governance and
its evocation of the ‘steering’ analogy. An emphasis is placed on recognition of the
dynamism and complexity of the social and economic arena under consideration.
Governing is viewed as processual and distributed, not narrowly centred on a single
actor (the government or the state as an entity), nor on a single moment of policy
decision that merely rolls out as intended. Various modes of governance are possible,
in various ‘mixes’ mainly of hierarchies, markets and networks. These relate to and
interact with each other in complex ways, and changes to any may have unintended
consequences in another.
For our purposes here, it may be best to draw upon Stoker’s statement of the governance concept in terms of five propositions

“1. Governance refers to a set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond government;

2. Governance identifies the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues;

3. Governance identifies the power dependence involved in the relationship between institutions involved in collective action;

4. Governance is about autonomous self-governing networks of actors;

5. Governance recognizes the capacity to get things done which do not rest on the power of government to command or use its authority”

(Stoker, 1998, p. 18)

This view seems to be of considerable value in examining the arena of skills training.

**Histories of policy on skills training and development**

The main reviews of skills training and development can be easily listed:

- The Carr report, 1958

- The White Paper 1962, followed by the Industrial Training Act of 1964

- The White Paper reviewing the 1964 Act, leading to the Employment and Training Act 1973

Training Boards; alongside this, the publication of proposals for ‘A New Training Initiative’

- The review of vocational qualifications leading to the establishment of the National Council for Vocational Qualifications in 1986;
- The Beaumont Review of National Vocational Qualifications, 1996
- The establishment of the Learning and Skills Council in 2001

What is less easy is to understand and explain the frequency of reviews and the basis for prescriptions, often very similar, at each review.

Textbook discussions of the public policy on training in the UK, generally tend to present descriptions of the current situation, coupled with brief history, mainly over the past five decades, varying in the detail provided. In the fourth edition of her textbook, Harrison (2005) mainly focuses upon the recent and current scene, referring readers interested in the key stages in the development of UK policy to Cannell’s factsheet produced for CIPD (Cannell, 2004). Reid et al. (2004) intersperse references to public policy in a historical review of the ‘evolution of HRD’, followed by a mainly descriptive account of the current institutional context. Gibb (2002) mainly focuses upon the recent scene, but is perhaps more analytical than the previous two mentioned books. Hamlin’s chapter (Hamlin, 1999) in Stewart’s textbook (Stewart, 1999) is now somewhat outdated in respect of the current UK context, but does present what is probably the most detailed history as well as discussing other countries and presenting critical discussion.
The obvious danger with descriptions of current public policy arrangements is the historic tendency for these to be subject to frequent change. Presentations of history can tend to be content-focussed, in effect, chronicles or descriptive accounts of ‘one damned thing after another’. Alternatively, they may fall into the category of whig histories, in which the present scene is implicitly taken to be the inevitable outcome of the past. To be of use, the history of policies on workforce development need a framework for analysis, in order to identify the key factors and forces at work. Sometimes it may be wider, macro-level factors that are significant; at other times, there may be more micro-level, or meso-level factors in play, that are more significant.

Reviews and reforms

There has always been a clear recognition in the many reviews over the past half-century that employers must have a leading role in ensuring that the UK workforce develops the skilled capacity needed for the UK economy to maintain and develop its competitive position within the global economy. There has also been recognition that, without some additional influences, economic forces in terms of the activities of individual employers will be insufficient to meet the needs of the economy as a whole, the problem of ‘market failure’. Various interventions by government have therefore attempted to use a mixture usually of exhortation, fiscal measures, and the creation and reform of quasi-government institutions, and sought the co-operation of existing associations within civil society. There has, arguably, been a tendency to look to a single major intervention as the basis for reform, rather than taking account of the
processes by which the various elements implicated might act and interact to bring about the state of affairs. There has been even less attempt to examine how the particular state of affairs that exists at the time of any review has come about. Leitch (2006) restricts his main examination of the period from 1964 to the present to less than a page and a half, and confusingly uses the phrase “the previous system” (p. 48) to refer to what clearly has involved several different attempts to create a stable and effective set of arrangements.

There has also been a tendency to look to similar ways to address the problems as understood. Whilst the era of the industry training boards (ITBs) stands out as one apparently different from the preceding and subsequent periods of voluntarism, there has continued to be a reliance on sectorally-based organisations, recognised by government as having strategic responsibilities for issues of standards and quantity of skills training. ITBs were replaced by Non-Statutory Training Organisations (NSTOs), followed by National Training Organisations (NTOs) then sector skills councils. Various approaches to provide for some aspects of national oversight have been created: Industrial Training Council (post-Carr), Central Training Council (from the 1964 Act), Manpower Services Commission (MSC) (created by 1973 Act), Training Agency (from 1988), Learning and Skills Council (from 2001). To such national bodies we can add other national agencies working alongside existing national bodies, notably the National Council for Vocational Qualifications and now Leitch’s proposal for a Commission for Employment and Skills. Locally-based approaches have been tried, including local group training schemes, area manpower boards, training and enterprise councils (and local enterprise companies in Scotland), locally-based learning and skills councils, and now Leitch’s proposal for a network of
employer-led employment and skills boards. Throughout the period there has been repeated exhortation from government ministers and individuals appointed to key positions in the national agencies, and the use of financial support and inducements on a changing set of initiatives, usually expressed in terms of the initials of their names: eg TOPS, UVP, YOP, YTS, ET, NVQ, ILA. Such constant reworking of similar attempts to remedy what is generally recognised as a ‘failing system’ suggests a failure to heed Santayana’s dictum that “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”. Or, rather, those who fail to examine the past and learn from it, are condemned to repeat it. With that in mind, the next section takes a key period in the history of policy on skills training, the abolition of ITBs, and re-examines it in terms of a governance approach.

**Abolition of Industrial Training Boards: a reconsideration**

The all-party supported Industrial Training Act of 1964 and the Employment and Training Act of 1973 seemed to entrench an interventionist approach to public policy in respect of skills development. Yet within less than a decade after that second Act, the policy had been effectively reversed. The decision to abolish all but six (of 23) ITBs that had been established under the powers of the 1964 Act would thus seem to be a prime candidate for examination in any attempt to understand public policy on skills training. However, most presentations of this decision tend to pass by with barely a comment. Cannell (2004) states that

“a review was embarked upon which resulted in the 1981 Employment and Training Act. This empowered the Employment Secretary to set up, abolish or change the scope of ITBs.”

Hamlin (1999, p. 41) similarly reports that there were ‘detailed reviews of the working of the 1973 Act “which led to the 1981 Employment and Training Act”, and
that 16 of the ITBs were abolished and “replaced by more than 200 voluntary Industry Training Organisations (ITOs)”.

Gibb (2002, p. 232) does not mention the abolition of ITBs, but asserts that

“by 1981 the need to change the institutional context again was evident, and another Employment and Training Act was passed. This created Industry Training Organisations (ITOs), which were to be the new means of re-involving employers more in the analysis, design and delivery of training in the UK.”

Such presentations seem to suggest or assert a straightforward, even inevitable, process leading to a settled outcome. Examination of the policy process indicates a different story.

*Developing policy on ITBs*

In attempting to understand how particular policies come about, it is important to recognise that a number of forces are at work. James (1997, pp. 6-8) points out that we can identify four main ‘dynamic forces’ at work in the policy-making process:

- the partisan dynamic
- the administrative dynamic
- the public dynamic
- the ‘interest’ dynamic

The particular path taken through the policy-making process, and the particular policy outcome, will be affected significantly by the interaction between these forces. The first, the partisan dynamic, applies to the political direction for policy provided by the governing party. This can certainly be seen in the strong direction given when the Conservative Party won the 1979 election and Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister. But governments and ministers have to work with and through existing administrative machinery, primarily the civil service, which advises on policy changes, and translates governmental and ministerial wishes into detailed policies and procedures for implementation. The public dynamic is, James states, “the most
difficult to define precisely”, taking the form of public opinion usually reflected in various ways including media interest and coverage, and through parliamentary pressure. The ‘interest’ dynamic comes from pressure groups, some of which are membership groups pressing for their sectional interest whilst others are concerned with matters of more ‘altruistic’ concern.

Such a framework of policy dynamics can clearly be applied to the skills training policy arena. The policy decision taken in 1981 to abolish the majority of ITBs can be viewed in terms of three of the four dynamics, with the public dynamic having little influence. There was certainly no hint of a groundswell of public opinion in support of protecting ITBs from demise, particularly as unemployment rose rapidly and inner-city disturbances gained high profile media coverage.

**Administrative dynamic**

The first Secretary of State for Employment in the Thatcher government was James Prior, generally reckoned to be a ‘moderate’ and who admits that he was surprised to be appointed to the post (Prior, 1986). He was replaced in 1981 by Norman Tebbit, whose support for, and by, Margaret Thatcher is well-documented. Prior instructed the MSC to set up a review body in July 1979 to the 1973 Act. The matter thus became one that was subject to the *administrative dynamic*, in James’ terms (James, 1997). The view expressed by Gibb, stated above, on the ‘evident’ need to change the institutional context, is hardly borne out by the findings of that review (Manpower Services Commission, 1980). Amongst the conclusions were that the existing mixed system of statutory ITBs and voluntary joint bodies had important strengths “particularly in securing involvement of both sides of industry in ways appropriate to each sector”. What was needed, the review report argued, was “to build on the
strengths of the existing system and adapt and develop it to do the job more effectively”. Moreover, the report recommended removal of the 1% limit on the levy, and allowing ITBs discretion in in exempting employers from levy. The review argued that the system of granting full exemption from levy to any employer that demonstrated that it was meeting its own company training needs may not always work to the country’s benefit. Both the 1% limit on levy and the levy exemption system had been introduced by the 1973 Act, which was thus seen to have undermined key aims of the 1964 Act.

However, the review report, ‘Outlook on Training’, did recommend a review of the scope of ITBs, ie the definition, for each board, of the sector it covered under its statutory powers. This led James Prior to ask the MSC for a sector-by-sector review. That review, covering 42 sectors, of which 23 were covered by statutory ITBs and one (foundry industry) by a industry training committee with similar powers, was completed by July 1981 when the report was published with recommendations (Manpower Services Commission, 1981a). In not one single case did the MSC recommend that an existing ITB be closed. The report noted, in several places, that the Government had indicated its ‘general preference’ for voluntary arrangements, but expressed concern at the speed with which it had required the sector-by-sector review, particularly as the outcomes were awaited on major consultation by the MSC as ‘A New Training Initiative’ (Manpower Services Commission, 1981b) started in May that year. The report called attention to the

“risks in prescribing a return to a regime similar to that which existed before 1964 despite the progress made since then.”
(Manpower Services Commission, 1981a, para. 6.3)

It would seem then that the **administrative dynamic** was oriented towards retention of statutory ITBs.
Despite the MSC’s recommendations, on 16th November, the Secretary of State for Employment, Norman Tebbit, announced in the House of Commons that he intended to retain only six boards, and abolish the others. He took this decision, he stated, “in the light of the extensive consultations that have taken place and the recommendations made ...by the Manpower Services Commission” (Hansard, 16th November 1981, col. 30; emphasis added). In response to a question from a Labour MP, he stated that “it is in large measure to what industry has requested that I have acted”. In concluding the question and answer session lasting about 30 minutes, Tebbit stated that

“I am sure that there is no opposition to the idea that the Government should do all they can to improve training in industry. That is common ground. What is not common ground is that the only way to do that is through the statutory structure, which in some cases has been extremely ineffective”. (op. cit., col. 40).

The radical partisan nature of the Thatcher Government is well-known and well-documented, not least by Margaret Thatcher and her close supporters at the time. It is associated with policies aimed at removal of impediments to the operation of the ‘free market’, reducing the influence of trade unions and their ability to engage effectively in disputes, the reduction of state expenditure and levels of taxation, the ‘rolling back the frontiers of the state’ and greater emphasis on self-reliance. In this context, it is worth noting that Tebbit’s decision to abolish ITBs was taken under powers granted only that year, in the Employment and Training Act 1981. Prior to that, under the 1973 Act, an ITB could only be abolished on the recommendation of the MSC. The inclusion of a specific new power to make such a radical decision against MSC advice, suggests a clear intention to make decisions on a partisan view of what is appropriate, rather than relying upon the considered judgement of the very agency created to remove training affairs from partisan politics. It would be easy then to
regard Tebbit’s announcement as merely another example of those policies in action. However, that would be to miss out other important influences on the policy decision. 

_Influencing agencies_

One significant influence on the policy process over the period was that of a report by the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS), the No. 10 Downing Street ‘think tank’. Published in May 1980, ‘Education, Training and Industrial Performance’ (Central Policy Review Staff, 1980) came with a statement on its inside cover asserting

“This report ... is being published as a contribution to public discussion. Publication does not imply that the Government are committed to all aspects of the analysis nor to all the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report.”

A document produced in October 1980, by the ITBs branch of the union ASTMS, representing professional staff grades in seven ITBs, put the matter differently:

“It is likely that the Report, submitted directly to the Cabinet, will be at least as influential in shaping any new Training Act as the Review conducted by the MSC and published as Outlook on Training.”  

(ASTMS ITBs Branch, 1980)

It is instructive at this point to note the parallel with the similarity of the Performance and Innovations Unit’s report (Performance and Innovation Unit, 2001) to Leitch’s report.

The CPRS report contains many terms and phrases that came to have significant resonance later. It drew upon the Donovan Commission Report in 1968 to recommend that “objective standards to be laid down by which qualifications may be judged”, and removal of ‘artificial barriers’ on entry to training, to avoid the use of the concept of skill as a ‘restrictive labour practice’. Individuals should have a personal training record, indicating particular skills acquired; this was referred to as ‘the passport approach’. Reference was also made to a ‘jungle of qualifications’. ITBs should no longer monitor the amount and type of training by employers, but promote reform of existing schemes and innovation in areas currently neglected.
Another influence was a report published by the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) (Elliot and Mendham, 1981), a ‘think-tank’ founded in 1974 by Sir Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher “to champion economic liberalism in Britain”. The report’s argument is indicated by its title: ‘Industrial Training Boards: Why They Should be Dismantled’. The authors asserted that ITBs are bureaucratic and costly, and cannot prove their effectiveness. Whatever the merits, and faults, of the report, its provenance suggested the view that would be adopted by a Government whose policies had largely emerged from the CPS.

Other ‘associations’ that had some role in the policy process obviously include employer bodies and trade unions. The idea that employers were overwhelmingly opposed to the continued existence of ITBs is clearly wrong. The MSC’s sector-by-sector review indicated a mixed response by employer bodies. Even where employer bodies had argued for abolition of an ITB, there was often no clearly viable alternative proposed. This indicates a significant degree of fragmentation in various sectors, such that there was little coordination amongst employers on training arrangements.

The influence of trade unions in such policy process was clearly minimal, reflecting the determination to reduce the perceived power of unions. However, the three TUC members (Commissioners) of the MSC remained in their posts throughout this period, and continued to do so until 1988 when the Training Commission (which had replaced the MSC that year) was abolished following Congress decision to boycott the Employment Training scheme for unemployed adults. Despite calls from within the
trade union and labour movement, the TUC apparently considered it better to be in ‘the corridors of power’ to try to influence policy and its implementation. Admittedly, the critical voices were often ‘grassroots’ groups which failed to gain a significant degree of support outside of their immediate circles.

However, the ITBs branch of ASTMS was able to get support for motions put to the union’s annual conferences over the period from 1982 to 1986, instructing the union’s executive council to seek to gain TUC General Council agreement to impose conditions for continued participation in MSC. Despite such motions being carried, with overwhelming support, the instructions were not carried out. The fact that General Secretary Clive Jenkins, chaired the TUC’s Education Committee, suggests an unwillingness to ‘rock the boat’. Matters eventually came to a head over the 1988 Congress resolution on Employment Training; but the outcome was further reduction in the TUC’s influence, as the Commission was abolished and its work was taken over by the Training Agency reporting to the Department of Employment.

The 1981 decision to abolish the majority of the ITBs can thus be seen to have emerged through a policy process much more complex than often described. A variety of actors were involved, with varying interests and able to engage in different aspects of policy dynamics. Clearly, it was ultimately the legal power bestowed on the Secretary of State to abolish an ITB, with or without a recommendation from MSC, that enabled the final decision. Except, that is to say, that it was not the ‘final’ decision.
Aftermath

The policy decision taken in November 1981 did not automatically ensure that the espoused policy aims would be achieved. In so far as the policy was intended to lead to an improvement in training and skills levels amongst the British workforce, it could clearly only be effected by the actions of others. These include individual employers undertaking appropriate training, for which there may be the need for some coordination with other employers with the aid of a statutory ITB or Non-Statutory Training Organisation (NSTO). Moreover, individual employees would need to play their part, for which there may be the need for trade unions to engage in appropriate relationships with employers to provide support for training; and employers would need, where relevant, to engage appropriately with trade unions.

The term ‘Non-Statutory Training Organisations’ (NSTOs) was used to refer to employer bodies that either took over from ITBs, or already covered sectors for which no ITB existed, in 1982. In 1986, David Trippier MP, a junior minister in the Department of Employment, sought progress reports from 81 of these NSTOs; the responses suggested that “while some NSTOs were meeting expectations, others appeared to be less successful and a few were virtually moribund” (Varlaam, 1987, p. 1). In 1987, a MSC-commissioned report by the Institute of Manpower Studies found that only 56 (of the 102) NSTOs were effective; 15 were found to be ‘marginally effective’ whilst 11 were ‘ineffective or inactive’. It seems that the claims made by supporters of ITB abolition were nowhere near fully realised.

Moreover, two years prior to the report on NSTOs, the MSC and the National Economic Development Office has commissioned consultants Coopers and Lybrand
Associates to “investigate the main factors which influence the attitude of senior management to investment in training – and in human resource development generally” (Coopers and Lybrand Associates, 1984, p. 4). The report found that the attitude of senior management towards training could be best described as ‘complacent’. There was very little pressure on employers to invest in training, particularly from:

- comparisons with other companies
- individual employees or unions
- external commentators such as financial analysts
- Government (op. cit., p. 4-5)

Such an analysis was very much in line with previous analyses; there was certainly no indication that the move back to voluntary arrangements in 1981 had led to significant improvements. Interestingly, amongst the proposals were the obligation to include ‘measures of training effort’ in company reports, and the (pp. 17-19) and the establishment of workplace training committees (p. 27), both matters that gained little support at the time but which have returned in more recent discussions.

**Conclusion**

It is clear then that both policy development and decision over the period surrounding the announcement of the abolition of most of the ITBs, emerged from a complex set of processes involving a variety of actors and agencies in various ways. Moreover, whatever the decisions taken by the government, the outcomes in terms of the levels and quality of training undertaken were themselves emergent from the decisions and actions of a variety of other actors, individually and in association. The orderliness, or otherwise, of the organisation and coordination of skills development at a level
beyond that of the individual employer is a matter that cannot easily be achieved, and any attempt to devise measures and frameworks to achieve it must take cognisance of such difficulty. A governance perspective provides an approach that highlights key elements. In so doing it indicates that there is no inevitability of particular policy decisions. More importantly, it indicates that policy decision by government is insufficient to bring about the state of affairs that, purportedly, is desired by all.

The period around the fateful decision regarding ITBs taken in 1981 is obviously amenable to retrospective analysis. The preceding discussion has attempted to undertake that analysis adopting a governance approach. The history of previous reviews of policy and their consequent prescriptions is not one that can be regarded as successful, raising questions, even doubts, about the current review by Leitch. If it is accepted that a governance approach to analysis of earlier reviews is useful, then its deployment to the current situation is warranted.

References


